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September 03, 2010, Friday

Is it necessary to rename militia in police in Russia?










Voting results:
Yes
11%
 
No
33%
 
Militia is “the communist past”
22%
 
Police is a “bourgeois institute”
0%
 
The word “police” will not become naturalized in Russia
0%
 
It is not the name but the attitude to responsibilities that matters
22%
 
The new name will change the mentality of Russian militiamen
0%
 
Nothing will change their mentality
0%
 
It is all the same to me I want them do they job properly.
11%
 

Results of last votings
Main Chechen history History of Chechnya in the 19-20th Centuries
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Chapter Four. Chechnya and Dagestan in the Period of the Golden Age and Crisis of the Imamat (late 40s –50s, 19th Century)

As a result of military triumphs scored by the mountaineers in the early 40s of the 19th century, large swaths of territory in Dagestan and Chechnya with a total population of up to 600,000 people came under Shamil’s leadership.

The chief distinction of the new state was that it was formed in the course of a fierce war and it was the conduct of military operations against an external enemy that became the chief function of the imamat. The principles known from the times of the Arab caliphate were laid into the foundation of the state’s formation. In keeping with those principles – the top leader of the state – the imam possessed the nation’s supreme state and spiritual authority.

In the 1840s a number of written codes and regulations were elaborated and adopted, which regimented the activity of the state apparatus and daily lives of residents in the imamat in keeping with the norms of the Sharia laws. Actually, Shamil undertook a second attempt in the history of Chechnya and Dagestan, after sheikh Mansur, to create an Islamic military theocratic state. In this effort he also came up against mountaineers resistance who did not wish to part with customary adages and their traditional life-styles of quite democratic character. This struggle, particularly in Chechnya, proved to be hard-going for the imam. This explains the fact that many clauses of the adopted laws (nizahms) essentially varied from the norms listed in the Sharia code of laws. Russian historian R. Fadeyev wrote that “of all the eastern mountaineers, the Chechens more than others retained personal and social independence and forced Shamil, who ruled Dagestan despotically, make them thousands of concessions in the form of government, people’s obligations, ritual compliance with faith”.

Despite the theocratic façade and the preeminent role of the clergy, in real life authority in the imamat quickly went to the fast growing military leadership. Although most military leaders (naib) possessed spiritual titles, they were first and foremost military officers, and their authority was enforced through military power.

In order to maintain many members of the military, the population in the imamat was subjected to heavy taxation and other obligations. For example, all men between the ages of 15 and 50 were supposed to be enlisted in the militia. And each peasant family was made to give away a large share of their harvest to meet the needs of the militia. Not infrequently, this provoked peasants’ discontent  , which was dealt with by ruthless punishment.

An open exploitation of the peasantry, expropriation of public lands and appropriation of the most part of military loot, turned Shamil’s retinue and himself into a new feudal elite, which disposed of vast riches.

Shamil’s policy inevitably resulted in an internal crisis, whose first signs became apparent by the mid-40s. It is at this time that some Chechnya’s inhabitants fled the imamat to Russia. As Czarist officials reported, “the people who initially espoused whole-heartedly the new teaching, distanced themselves from it and experienced in reality the monstrous despotism of government promised to them initially as an ideal of life on earth”.

Nevertheless, military operations by Czarist troops in the mountainous areas of Chechnya and Dagestan continued to meet with one setback after another. This made the Czarist authorities to change their tactics. The overriding idea adopted by the Czarist command was to seize from the imamat the plains lands in Chechnya, which served as the people primary food and economic base. For this purpose, military settlers – the Cossacks were moved to Chechen lands along the Sunja River. Cossacks’ settlements were turned into fortresses. At the same time a massive felling of Chechnya’s forests was underway.

Along with military efforts, the Russian authorities also sought to attract the mountaineers’ Muslim clergy. In order to hamper the spread of Muridism, the Czarist government dispatched from Kazan Tartar mullahs, who took over the duties of muftis in the Caucasus. In 1849 the government set up 8 spiritual schools for Caucasian Muslims , believing that these educational establishments would be able to educate a new generation of mountainous  Muslim mullahs, loyal to the Russian empire.

It is true that there were some Muslim clerics in the Northern Caucasus who were vehemently opposed to the militant policies of the Dagestani imams. They heaped severe criticism on the military-totalitarian state created by Shamil. Some influential military officers under Shamil, including Khadji-Murat, went into secret talks with the Russian military command. Khadji-Murat accused by Shamil of treason had to flee Chechnya to the Russians. But his family found itself in Shamil’s captivity, which forced Khadji-Murat to make another escape, this time from the Russians back to Shamil. This attempt cost him his life.

At the end of 1851 commander Bata Shamurzayev openly sided with the Russians. He took an active part in the war against the imam and was raised to the rank of captain and subsequently awarded 500 dessiatins of land. Considering his merits and perhaps in order to set an example for other potential defectors, the Russian authorities made him commander of the Kachkalyk region.

In the early 50s Shamil’s state was undergoing a profound internal crisis. General mistrust and suspiciousness reigned at the top of the imamat because Shamil saw a  rival in each influential leader. Determined to transfer his authority to his son Gazi-Mukhammed, Shamil was prepared to ruin anyone suspected of opposing his plans. Deep frustration set in among the populace, as the war wiped out the flower of the mountaineers and its pursuance spelt no bright prospects.

The internal weakness of the imamat did not allow Shamil to take advantage of the Crimean War of 1853-1856. The allies in the anti-Russian coalition considered the Caucasus as one of their main theaters of operation. Turkey promised military support for Shamil. The internal strife in the imamat, however, prevented Shamil from conducting effective operations against the Russian army. On the other hand, the Russian command was able to amass up to 12,000 mountaineers as volunteers in the Northern Caucasus, including about 1,000 Chechens, who took an active part in military operations against Turkish troops in Transcaucasia.

The Crimean War did nothing to relieve pressure on the mountaineers of the  Northern Caucasus. On the contrary, it induced Russia to step up its offensive in order to bring the war to a speedy conclusion. Together with persistent forays on Chechen lands, the Russian authorities elaborated a special code to rule over them. Thus, it was envisaged to establish the post of a ruler over all the Chechen people, to set up s special Chechen court and to establish a Chechen district governed by a chief district foreman. All rural foremen were supposed to report to him directly.

All these circumstances ever more frequently led to the flight to Russian-governed territories of common villagers, but also high-ranking members of the imamat.

Stepping up its military efforts to bring the Caucasian war to a speedy and successful conclusion, Russia threw into battle more and more fresh forces, and by 1859 their number rose up to 308,000 officers and men. 200,000 of them were deployed in Chechnya and Dagestan.

The results of such massive and persistent pressure of the Russian command became promptly apparent. Chechens deserted the imamat by whole communities. By 1858 Greater and Minor Chechnya completely ceded from Shamil’s state. Shamil still hoped to put up a long resistance in the mountains, but a war in the mountains no longer presented insoluble problems for the Russian command. Most Russian commanders had accumulated a vast practical experience of military hostilities in the mountains, which was summed up and used advantageously.

In the spring of 1859 the Russian troops were battling for the imamat’s capital – Vedeno. Deserted by nearly all Chechen chieftains, who were left without troops, Shamil fled to Dagestan. But even there he was faced with a complete fiasco. His closest associates one by one sided with the Russians.

In August 1859, a 30,000-strong Russian army under the command of prince A.Baryatinsky laid a siege to the village of Gunib, where Shamil took cover with 400 of his most loyal troops. They were battling against overwhelming odds and Shamil decided to surrender. The Czarist government proclaimed Shamil an honorary captive, settling him and his family in the city of Kaluga with an annual allowance of 20,000 roubles.

The Caucasian war became the biggest and most significant socio-political and state event in the history of Russia of the 19th century. Russia was spending in the Caucasus one-sixth of its state revenues and was losing thousands of officers and men during 1840-1859, in the period of Shamil’s imamat. All in all, from 1801 to 1859 almost 400,000 Russian soldiers died in the Caucasus on the battle field, of wounds, epidemics and unbearable conditions of life.

 
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